Trust · The Mark
A seal that proves the file wasn't switched.Tamper evidence, not a truth badge.Content-addressed report identity.SHA-256 registry check, offline.
The Mark answers one small question perfectly: is this file the exact one we checked? It never says "this is true" — nothing can say that. It says "this hasn't been swapped or edited since we looked." Every delivered report is recorded by its SHA-256 fingerprint. Match a file against its record and you know it is byte-for-byte the artifact that went through the gate — unaltered, unswapped. That is all the Mark claims, which is why it can keep the claim. The Mark is deliberately narrow: it binds a verdict to a specific byte sequence, closing the swap-and-cite loophole — quoting a Solonic verdict over an edited artifact. Identity, not endorsement; there is no mark of truth, and this page is where we refuse to sell one. mark_check tool in /solonic-mcp.py: hash local file → compare to registry record → match verdict. No network, no Solonic dependency at check time. Forgery challenge below.
What it does — and refuses to do
- Certifies
- That a file is byte-identical to the one recorded when its review was delivered. If a single character changed, the check fails.
- Never certifies
- That the file's claims are true. Truth doesn't come with a seal — only evidence, and it points both ways. The verdicts live inside the report; the Mark only proves the report is the report.
- Why it exists
- The cheapest attack on a verification record isn't forging the check — it's editing the artifact afterward and citing the old verdict. The Mark makes that attack fail loudly.
Check one yourself — we're not in the loop
Verification you must trust a vendor to perform is not verification. The check runs locally, offline, in the single-file server anyone can read:
# the mark_check tool, in solonic-mcp.py # 1. hash the file you were given (SHA-256) # 2. compare to the registry record (shipped with your report) # 3. verdict: MATCH or NO MATCH — nothing else # no network. no API key. no Solonic dependency at check time.
A hash check is only as good as its independence, so the tool is short on purpose — read it before you run it. That's not a courtesy; it's the design.
The standing challenge
Forge a Mark and we retire it in public. Produce a file whose SHA-256 matches a registry record but whose content differs, and the Mark is broken — it gets a Refuted entry in the Ledger with your name on it, and we stop issuing it. This is a hash-collision dare, and we make it in the open because a tamper-evidence scheme that fears its attackers is already broken. Submissions: [email protected].